

STAT
Capt George A. D'Angelo



Lt General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director/Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

8 Jan 1973

Dear General Walters,

Enclosed is the thesis we talked about during our brief meeting following your graduation address to the Defense Attache School on 8 December 72.

You mentioned in your remarks, and in our conversation, your concern for the future promotion of attaches. This of course is a major concern of many of us in the attache system. In fact, my thesis topic was prompted by the many discouraging "counsellings" I received from higher ranking officers when I was contemplating an Attache assignment. The overwhelming consensus seems to be that an attache assignment is a "dead end" for a military career, and I was always told that General Walters was the exception. Since most detractors point to the lack of promotions from Colonel to General, this is the area of concentration in my study.

I have attempted to determine whether this lack of promotions is due to the nature of the assignment itself, or the caliber of individuals injected into the system. Because of the selection process and the scarcity of O6 applicants, I feel that the latter is the major factor. But then again, few really outstanding O6s will volunteer for an assignment which they think, rightly or wrongly, will hurt their career.

In all fairness to the Air Force, I must admit that they have greatly upgraded their selection process. My wife and I were interviewed by a B/G, four Colonels and a GS16! Obviously both M/G Keegan and B/G Smith are taking a keen interest in attache selectees. It is also encouraging to see that eliminations are now occurring during language and attache training.

While selection of more suitable and better qualified personnel goes a long way in solving the problems of promotion, it still remains for higher ups to look after their people and get them promoted. Perhaps in a few years when I apply for a second tour there won't be quite as many saying "don't do it"!

DIA review(s) completed.

I hope you like the thesis, and I will welcome any criticisms you might have. Hoping to see you in Liberia for that aerial tour I promised you.

Sincerely yours,

Capt George A. D'Angelo
GEORGE A. D'ANGELO

ATTACHES

24 January 1973

Dear Captain D'Angelo,

Many thanks for sending me a copy of your thesis which I read with great interest. Congratulations on the good work. It is a very comprehensive and informative report. I also feel that progress in upgrading the Attaché System is evident and was heartened to see the recent promotion of an Air Attaché to the rank of Brigadier General. It should prove inspiring.

I, too, hope to see you in Liberia and I look forward to the aerial tour. With every good wish to you for a good year and renewed thanks.

Faithfully,

Vernon A. Walters
Lieutenant General, USA


Captain George A. D'Angelo



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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL



Intelligence Research Paper

THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM:

TODAY AND TOMORROW (u)

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4 February 1974

This intelligence research paper represents fulfillment of a student requirement in the Defense Intelligence School's Post-graduate Intelligence Course.

The opinions, judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the Defense Intelligence School, the Defense Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.

W. J. Furnas

W. J. FURNAS
Captain, USN
Commandant

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THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM:

TODAY AND TOMORROW (u)

A Thesis

Presented to

The Advanced Intelligence Branch

Defense Intelligence School

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the
Intelligence Research Project

by

Lt Col Donn C. Winner

PGIC 1-74

May 1974

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The author wishes to express his gratitude to Lieutenant General Walters, Rear Admiral Rectanus, Major General Wilson, Brigadier General Faurer and Major General Aaron (listed in order of interview date) for their generosity in making their valuable time and invaluable expertise available in support of this research paper.

Also, many thanks must go to Mrs. Dorothy Matlack for her extended efforts in support of the interview with Major General Aaron.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Lieutenant Colonel Donn C. Winner, [REDACTED] was FOIA B3D
commissioned in the U. S. Air Force in 1955 upon completion of
Aviation Cadet training. He was assigned to Mountain Home AFB,
Idaho, from 1955 until 1958, serving as a KC-97 co-pilot and as
a combat crew training officer for the 9th Bombardment Wing,
Strategic Air Command. After qualifying in the KC-135 at Castle
AFB, California, in early 1959, he was assigned to the 34th Air
Refueling Squadron, Offutt AFB, Nebraska. After graduating from
Squadron Officer School at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1962, he was
assigned to Bergstrom AFB, Texas, and then to Dow AFB, Maine, in
1964, serving as a KC-135 pilot and instructor pilot at both
locations. In 1967, he was assigned to U-Tapao Air Base, Thailand,
as a KC-135 operations officer and instructor pilot. In 1968,
he moved to the Washington, D.C. area for intelligence and
foreign language training preparatory to assignment to the Defense
Attache System. In January of 1970, he began a 3 1/2 year tour
as Assistant Air Attache in the Republic of Turkey. He returned
to the United States in the summer of 1973 to attend the Post-
graduate Intelligence Course, Defense Intelligence School. He is
currently assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DI-2B1) in
the Pentagon building.

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ABSTRACT

During his tour of duty as an Assistant Air Attache from January 1970 through June 1973, the author developed a deep interest in the Defense Attache System as a whole. Through his personal observations, and through conversations with fellow attaches in his own and other Defense Attache Offices, he became aware of many problems existing in the Defense Attache System, some of which were trifling, others which seemed to merit considerable concern.

Having gained several views of Defense Attache System problems from within the system, the author felt that new dimensions and perspectives might be reached by soliciting the viewpoints of some senior officers connected with the system, and that those viewpoints coupled with the author's observations might be of some value to other personnel dealing with attache matters.

Therefore, by interviews with the five officers listed below, by citing observations of past and present attaches, and by augmenting these with his own observations, the author attempts to assess certain significant problems of the Defense Attache System. The interviewees were:

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters

Major General Samuel V. Wilson

Rear Admiral Earl F. Rectanus

Major General Harold R. Aaron

Brigadier General Lincoln D. Faurer

The author concludes that the Defense Attache System, despite its problems, is a vital asset of the United States Government; and that, while there are no easy solutions to some of those problems, there are some steps that can be taken to improve the overall effectiveness of the system.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Since the year 1888, the United States has authorized the assignment of military attaches to various posts abroad and, although military attaches were under the direct control of their parent services for over 75 years, a unified organizational element known as the Defense Attache System consolidated such activity as of July 1, 1965. This latter structure has remained in effect to this date. 2: 10-13

The functions of a military officer stationed abroad as an Air, Army, or Naval Attache are manifold. The primary function of such officers, as evidenced by the command structure which places the Defense Attache System under the control of the Defense Intelligence Agency, is the gathering of intelligence. It is toward this end that the bulk of an Attache's training is aimed, and it is upon his success (or failure) in this area that his performance is mainly judged. However, the Attache on station is also the official representative of his parent U. S. military service to the counterpart military service of his host country. In some instances, he will also represent the U. S. Secretary of Defense. In some smaller countries, an officer of one U. S. military service may act as the Attache for one or more of the

other U. S. services, as well as his own. Additionally, military attaches are normally the primary advisors to the U. S. ambassador in their host country, on matters of U. S. military capabilities and concerns. The Attache:

"Advises chief of diplomatic mission on matters of military import such as military capabilities of host government from a military point of view. Makes recommendations on treaties, international agreements, and politico-military plans, policies, and procedures." 1:4-5

Dependent upon the precise relationship of the United States with the host government concerned, the military attache may also have responsibilities for administration of related portions of the U. S. Military Assistance Program. Additionally, the military attache invariably finds himself acting as a high level assistant to his ambassador on a host of other matters, ranging from escorting visiting Congressional delegations, to preparing replies to inquiries from host country nationals on subjects whose relationship to military matters may only exist in the mind of the ambassador.

The above summary of functions of an Attache is purposely brief, as it is not the intention of this research paper to delve into the roles of the military attaches in detail. Captain George A. D'Angelo, USAF, in his 1972 Master of Arts thesis, The Contemporary Role of the Military Attache and Problems Relating to the Attainment of a Quality Corps has done a superb and very complete job of outlining the complicated duties that

fall upon an Attache, as well as many details of the evolution of the Defense Attache System. In that same thesis, he also presents excellent discussions of the Attache selection process (as of the date of his thesis), the preparation of an officer for assignment as an Attache, and of the capacities of Attaches to promote national goals in the process of execution of their duties. (Note: In the considered opinion of this writer, Captain D'Angelo's thesis should be "required reading" for any individual dealing with the selection, training, or any aspect of monitoring the performance or accomplishments of military attaches.)

It is the intended function of this paper to discuss in subsequent chapters, some contemporary aspects of the Defense Attache System that have, for various reasons, become items of concern to this writer during and following his tour of duty (1970-1973) as an Attache. In order to intelligently discuss these areas from standpoints beyond this writer's personal experiences, interviews were obtained with the 5 key military officers who seemed to be, at this time, the most influential (either directly or indirectly) on the current and immediate future courses of the Defense Attache System. These officers are:

1. Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, USA. Lieutenant General Walters is the acknowledged dean of U. S. Military Attaches. He has served as an Attache in Brazil, Italy, and

France. In his present capacity as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he is still vitally concerned with Attache activities.

2. Major General Samuel V. Wilson, USA. Major General Wilson is a former Army and Defense Attache to Moscow. In his present capacity as Director of Attache Affairs, Defense Intelligence Agency, he has the direct managerial responsibility for the entire Defense Attache System.

3. Major General Harold R. Aaron, USA. Major General Aaron is Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Army. As such, he is responsible for all U.S. Army manpower and policy inputs into the Defense Attache System.

4. Rear Admiral Earl F. Rectanus, USN. Rear Admiral Rectanus is a former Naval Attache to Moscow and is currently Director of Naval Intelligence. He is responsible for all U. S. Navy manpower and policy inputs into the Defense Attache System.

5. Brigadier General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF. Brigadier General Faurer is the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Air Force. By direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAF, Brigadier General Faurer oversees USAF Attache selection and allied Attache Affairs.

Identical questions were put to each officer. Several of those questions were deliberately biased in their objectivity in order to be sure of provoking a definite response in either direction that could not straddle an issue. Each interview

was prefaced by remarks by this writer indicating the purpose of the interview and of this paper, and requesting that any "off the record" remarks be so caveated. However, all 5 officers were unanimous in indicating that any remarks they made could be quoted freely in this paper. All interviews were face to face, with the exception of that with Major General Aaron which was handled through an intermediary who submitted the identical questions in writing to him, and returned his written responses.

CHAPTER TWO
PROBLEMS OF THE SYSTEM

Probably the most controversial aspect of the Defense Attache System is the very fact that such an organization exists at all. A definite majority of the attaches this writer has talked with over the last several years have voiced strong criticism of the centralized attache system now in being. These individuals have felt, almost without exception, that a serious mistake was made when the individual military services were forced to give up direct control of their attaches to the Defense Intelligence Agency. And, while many of the faults found in the present system are relatively trifling, there are certain concrete objections that can definitely be related to the basic nature of such a centralized structure.

To start with, we now have a Defense Attache System. This means that on every post, the senior individual service attache has been designated as the Defense Attache (DATT). The DATT is, first of all, the single accredited in-country representative of the Secretary of Defense. The DATT also acts as a nominal commander of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in his country of assignment, although less in a conventional military sense, and more in a capacity of "chairman of the board." In other words,

the DATT exercises administrative control of the DAO, but normally avoids getting overly involved in matters that relate solely to individual service interests of other assigned attaches.

However, such involvement is often difficult to avoid, especially when other U.S. (or host country) officials feel that the DATT should become involved. For example, if one considers a situation wherein the DATT happened to be the Air Attache, and a discussion between the Naval Attache and the Ambassador over frequency of port calls by U.S. naval vessels was at an impasse, the Ambassador would be almost certain to try to involve the DATT in the problem.

And similarly, in situations such as frequently exist where the DAO must deal as an entity with a Foreign Liaison Office (FLO) of the host nation's military forces, that FLO may insist on involving the DATT in uncomfortable situations. To offer an example in the same framework as above, should the FLO be displeased with actions or statements by the Naval Attache concerning port visits, any expression of that displeasure is almost certain to be routed through the DATT. As Major General Aaron said in discussing this sort of situation:

"In some instances, the DATT concept causes degradation of the principle Service Attaches in their relation with the Ambassador and host government military." 8

And Rear Admiral Rectanus' comment on this subject was even stronger:

"The DATT system must be abolished. The present system is not logical. The service attache must be a major figure in his own right."⁵

Another area of concern to many attaches today that centers around the nature of the present system might be labeled "multiplicity of command." As a man serving three masters (the ambassador, DIA, and his parent service), the attache often finds it difficult to respond to his own service's intelligence requirements. While the attache is, first and foremost, a representative of his own military service - at least in its eyes, that service must of necessity often rank third in priority in many collection situations. As Major General Wilson stated:

"The attache must always remember that his first boss is his ambassador. He must report to the ambassador first, if he is to develop and maintain the rapport necessary to do his job properly."⁶

But in addressing this same problem, Major General Aaron said:

"My concern is that the DAS be responsive to me, as Chief of Army Intelligence. It, of course, should be responsive to DIA, but it must also be responsive to the service intelligence chiefs."⁸

Still another major problem area seen by many attaches lies in the area of individual officers' annual fitness or effectiveness ratings. Where these ratings are prepared by a member of another service (as under the DATT concept), and the officer writing the report is physically distant from knowledgeable sources he might otherwise consult, the possibility of the rater not being fully cognizant of the rating idiosyncrasies of the ratee's service may be a factor causing not only friction between

individuals, but damage to the career of the ratee as well. And while cross-service writing of fitness reports is a fact of life in all multi-service Department of Defense agencies, there are many responsible individuals who feel that to place the burden of such reports on a DATT can be grossly unfair to the ratee, who may be extending his efforts along lines dictated by his parent service, rather than along the precise course envisioned as best by the DATT. It may be that the best hope for some eventual improvement in this dilemma may be found along the lines envisioned by Brigadier General Faurer when he said:

"More individual service 'direction' of their own attaches would be desirable. And I think one attache should be the station's administrator, but that he should not have Officer Effectiveness Report responsibilities." ⁷

Another problem created by the DATT system that is of frequent concern to attaches is that of representation on the Ambassador's country team. Prior to the creation of the current organization, the attaches of all three services attended all country team meetings along with the rest of the Ambassador's senior staff. Now, under most conditions, only the DATT attends. As Major General Aaron says:

"I acknowledge that Ambassadors probably find the DATT concept acceptable and functionally desirable as a 'single point of contact.' However, the concept does not necessarily insure quality and professional input from the service attaches to the country team, i.e., a Navy DATT cannot advise definitively on Army matters." ⁸

Brigadier General Faurer reinforced this view when he said:

"There is the inherent possibility of inadequate representation of one or more individual services' needs or viewpoints."

And Rear Admiral Rectanus' statement in regard to this matter was almost identical to the one above, as was that of Lieutenant General Walters. Major General Wilson though, in answering the same question as the other senior officers ("Do you feel that the DATT concept is ideal in terms of country team representation?") said:

"Yes. It's what the Ambassadors want. The DATT must be prepared to bring his other attaches to the fore when their interests necessitate, however." ⁶

In still another area, a problem that is inherent in attache duty is complicated considerably by the DATT structure. That problem is one every attache must attempt to cope with: How can the responsibilities for intelligence collection be adequately balanced against the heavy demands of service representational occasions? In the personal experience of this writer, these representational requirements often were so heavy as to make independent intelligence collection efforts completely impossible for extended periods of time. These representational duties can range from attending endless social functions to the laying of a wreath; or from processing mountains of paperwork (in compliance with host country requirements) to obtain diplomatic aircraft clearances in support of a major U.S. military exercise to supporting exaggerated embassy red-carpet treatment given to

visiting U.S. functionaries; or from supporting simultaneous port visits by two or more U.S. Navy ships to dealing with a local national who has ridden his burro down from the hills in order to enlist in the U.S. Air Force and become an astronaut. And, under the DATT system, the DATT himself invariably ends up with many more representational responsibilities than he would have in his service attache capacity alone. Unfortunately, these additional responsibilities that befall the DATT in no way diminish the like duties that the other attaches in the DAO end up having to cope with. In regard to this problem, when asked what he saw as the future intelligence/representational duty balance, Lieutenant General Walters answered:

"About the same as at present. The two are so completely intertwined that you can't separate them." ⁴

This writer essentially agrees. Despite the frustrations involved, the entrees for collection that are gained through representation are by far the most numerous that an attache will normally obtain, and they often prove to be the best in qualitative terms as well. For example, a trip to a port city in support of a U.S. Navy ship visit will normally provide many collection opportunities relative to that port area, just as a party to introduce a visiting U.S. dignitary may provide exceptional access to a key host nation official. Unfortunately, the DATT himself, under the present organization, is often tied to so many such functions not of his own choosing that he frequently is unable to

allocate any time at all to collecting against the objectives his own service deems most important. In recognizing this problem, Brigadier General Faurer stated that he thought that attaches' ability to collect intelligence would probably continue to diminish in the future. ⁷

Commenting on the same matter, Rear Admiral Rectanus thought that:

"Representation must be about 75% of the job." ⁵

And Major General Wilson stated:

"I see a further turn toward representation. This side has been neglected to a degree in the past." ⁶

Major General Aaron indicated that he felt that:

"This balance must be worked out and determined by the requirement for each station. There will be no change in accrediting an Attache as a representative of his service. An Attache is never accredited as a collector. His collection duty and his representational duty are, and should be, established against the needs and objectives for each station." ⁸

In summarizing to this point, it may fairly be said that the Defense Attache System is faced with many problems, some of which are caused to at least some degree by the nature of the system itself. The very fact that the Defense Intelligence Agency has become an unwanted middleman between the services and the attaches they still look upon as their own, gives rise to some of the discord. However, it is difficult not to agree with Lieutenant General Walters when he says:

"I endorse the DATT concept in general. If the host country has a Minister of Defense, then it is certainly desirable to have a designated DATT. In countries such as some of those in South America where there is no Minister of Defense, then to display a DATT can be counterproductive. Regardless, the role of the DATT within the D.A.O. should be that of the chairman of the board." ⁴

And perhaps the strongest defense of the DATT concept, although mitigated with words of caution, came from Major General Wilson:

"I think we should retain and possibly strengthen the present system. I think you must have one man whom the ambassador as well as the host country can clearly recognize as being in charge of the D.A.O. This does not mean though that this should go too far. The DATT cannot be autocratic." ⁶

In the opinion of this writer, also, the system is here to stay. In increasingly austere times for the military, it is difficult to imagine any reversion to a costlier apparatus. And the one thing that almost everyone agrees on is that, by centralization, dollars are saved. What is still widely debated is whether those dollar savings are worth some of the headaches that the present system has brought. It seems evident, however, that regardless of the viewpoints held about such relative values, the present unified Defense Attache System is unlikely to revert to anything resembling the former independent service organizations.

CHAPTER THREE
CURRENT MANNING PROBLEMS
OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM

A major area of Attache concern for the past several years has been that of a diminishing quantity of personnel due to repeated reductions in strength within the Defense Intelligence Agency as a whole. As it is an area in which this writer has felt considerable concern, it was explored at some length with the 5 officers interviewed.

When asked, for example, if he thought the Defense Attache System was adequately manned at present, Major General Aaron stated:

"No, I do not. Since 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1973, Army Attache personnel have been cut 29%. In July 1965, there were 358 Army personnel assigned in DAS, as of 30 June 1973, there were 252 Army personnel. DIA is proposing to further reduce Army Attaches (officers) in the system by 5 spaces. I consider further reduction unacceptable, particularly as there are new DAOs to be opened FY 75. All of the proposed DAOs will have Army DATTs or Army Attaches. To open these stations, without additional space allocated to DAS, will require reallocation of current Army Attache spaces, thereby diminishing or eliminating Army presence and effectiveness in many areas." 8

And in answering the same question as to whether current Attache manning levels are adequate, Rear Admiral Rectanus replied:

"No. Absolutely not. Due largely to the high visibility of the system, plus the due constraints of bureaucracy, it's impossible to man the D.A.S. properly." 5

Viewing the matter from an Air Force standpoint, Brigadier General Faurer said:

"My answer is a 'reserved' yes, insofar as quantity is concerned. There are probably some stations where a few more people could be used, and we need an increased authorization when new stations are opened, but I think we have about the right number of people now." 7

and Major General Wilson, to the same question, replied:

"No. The system is still absorbing some cuts. In fact, because of the new stations we are opening up, a modest expansion is definitely in order. We do not yet have any additional bodies to man those new stations." 6

When then asked whether they thought that the Defense Attache System could withstand any future manpower cuts and still perform a significant intelligence mission, Major General Wilson was very emphatic when he answered:

"No. Any further cuts would inhibit, constrain, and diminish the attache system to a highly unsatisfactory degree. The D.A.S. should enjoy exempted status from any further cuts that might be levied against D.I.A." 6

Lieutenant General Walters answer was almost identical, and Rear Admiral Rectanus was equally emphatic about the thought of future cuts when he said:

"The system can't even support the Navy mission now. The attaches are insufficiently manned now to make all the visits, field trips, etc., that they ought to." 5

Generals Aaron and Faurer were perhaps less emphatic, but both also commented to the effect that they felt that the D.A.S. was at near minimum manning at the present. 8, 7

Then, when pressed even further by the question "Do you feel that DIA will (or should) protect the D.A.S. against further 'across the board' personnel or budgetary cutbacks?", Lieutenant General Walters answered:

"Yes. They've got to. The D.A.S. is their only organic collection asset." 4

To the same question, Rear Admiral Rectanus answered, "They should, absolutely." Major General Wilson answered, "If it is possible, I believe they will." Major General Aarons was perhaps even more pragmatic when he answered:

"I think DIA should protect the DAS against across the board personnel and budgetary cuts. Past performance and current indications are that they won't - when DIA is cut, a proportionate part of the cut is taken out of DAS even though the services object." 8

And what may have been the most prophetically realistic of the five well-reasoned answers might be that of Brigadier General Faurer when he replied:

"I guess I feel that they should. And I think that they will if it's within their power to do so. By that, I mean that if D.I.A. gets hit with a 5% cut, they could probably protect the D.A.S. But if they should get hit with a really heavy R.I.F., then I'm sure that the D.A.S. would suffer some losses." 7

Another problem in manning the D.A.S. properly that is also essentially a D.I.A. problem is one that is largely inherent

in the nature of the present system. As the D.A.S. now exists, the Defense Attache billet at each post is manned continually by whatever military service has been given primary responsibility for that post by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But, when it comes time to nominate officers in the grade of O-6 (Colonel or Navy Captain) as DATTs to multi-service manned posts, DIA enters the picture as the D.A.S. manager. And, in the process of that management, DIA has placed several restraints upon the services. These include:

1. Strict adherence to relating seniority or dates of rank (DORs) for DATT nominees on the one hand (three years minimum in grade), and other principal service attaches on the other hand (less than three years in grade).
2. A standardized length for tours of duty on station for all attaches of three years.
3. A requirement that a DATT nominee have sufficient tenure for at least a two year follow-on tour of duty after completion of his assignment in the D.A.S. (This is to avoid any chance of an officer lapsing into "semi-retirement" on station during a terminal duty tour--a situation which, unfortunately, has been known to occur.) And,
4. A selection process and a training process which together require identification of a prospective attache two or more years prior to actual assignment on station. The result of combining these DIA requirements with the less than 10 year actual

"service life" of an officer of this rank is that the selection of DATTs can only be from that limited group of officers who can arrive on station at the beginning of their 25th year of commissioned service (1/10 of the actual number of officers of that rank in service). Similarly, the principal service attaches who will not serve as DATT must be selected from those in their 20th year of service (again, only 1/10 of the officers of that rank actually serving), and these officers must be able to actually arrive on station prior to the beginning of their 22nd year of commissioned service. ^{3: 1,2}

To again quote Brigadier General Faurer:

"As the DATT concept presently exists, it causes many problems. It has resulted in less than optimum manning quality (because of the narrow D.O.R. 'window' for DATT selections)." ⁷

And Major General Aaron, in complete agreement, stated:

"I cannot completely endorse the DATT concept, particularly as it militates against selection and placement of best qualified personnel due to DOR and other constraints." ⁸

In this writer's service as an attache, during which he visited three attache offices other than his own, and had direct dealings with officers from six other DAOs, by far the greatest weakness in the D.A.S. appeared to him to lie in the quality of manning in the system. Attaches had long been selected essentially from among applicants only, and this writer often suspected that the selection process, in at least some cases, had been a woefully careless one. As a consequence, this writer

was curious as to what degree of recognition of this problem existed at the upper levels of management connected with the D.A.S.

As the comments of the senior officers interviewed will show in this chapter and in the one following, there very definitely was and is an awareness of this problem in all echelons.

As Major General Wilson said, reflecting on his feelings when he completed his tour of duty as Defense Attache in Moscow:

"I could see that there was great potential for the system to change for the better - especially in that as the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine meant a lower U.S. military presence in many parts of the world, the importance of the military attaches was bound to increase. In this context, it would become increasingly more important to pick the right people for the job. There is absolutely no substitute for professional credibility. Ideally, attaches should have 'smelt gunpowder.' In the past, I feel that there was too much 'cops and robbers' emphasis in the D.A.S. Too often, the attache resigned himself (and the powers to be limited him) to being merely a collector instead of being an observer. Now this is changing. Now we expect the attache to be an observer, and to include his opinions, comments, and interpretations as a key part of his reports. The attache of the future is going to be expected to have a degree of sophistication and intelligence not always demanded in the past. He should, ideally, also have an area background for his station of assignment." ⁶

And speaking specifically from his position as Director of Attache Affairs, DIA, Major General Wilson further commented on the current efforts to obtain a more highly qualified attache corps, when he said:

"This is the object of an intense drive by the SECDEF, the J.C.S. and others, and we're continually seeing improvement. In order to get the very best people provided us into the most critical positions, we're also categorizing (I, II, III) our stations by criticality of interest. This way, when we ask one of the services to man certain vacancies, we can be more explicit as to where we must have the best of the best." ⁶

And Brigadier General Faurer indicated that:

"As far as quality is concerned, the situation is moving toward the levels we want. I would say that within two years we should reach those levels." ⁷

In further summary then, it can be seen that certain manning problems have existed and do still continue within the D.A.S., and that DIA is the agency that must take primary action to further resolve the ones discussed thus far. As far as quantity of personnel is concerned, this writer feels that DIA should make extraordinary efforts to insulate the D.A.S. against further reductions in force. It would seem obvious that the most proficient intelligence analysts and the most competent production and dissemination systems are of little value, nor is there any intelligence cycle at all if the collection phase cannot function.

Also, it is obvious that in such austere times, the quality of the manning for each remaining billet becomes paramount. As the responsibilities increase in the manner prescribed above by Major General Wilson, it seems clear to this writer that it is incumbent upon DIA to accept nothing less than the very best officers that they know the services possess for these delicate

yet demanding positions.

And it would also seem necessary for DIA to seriously consider those aspects of the constraints they have placed upon the services that hinder the services' ability to provide that very quality that the D.A.S. must receive. While it may well be that many features of the present DATT system could be almost impossible to alter in prevailing budgetary and bureaucratic atmospheres, a review of aspects of the existing system that are, in fact, self defeating, must surely be in order.

CHAPTER FOUR
SERVICE SELECTION OF ATTACHES

One of the opinions first formed by this writer as he entered the Attache System, was the one alluded to in the previous chapter, i.e., that the overall manning quality of the Defense Attache System left much to be desired. As the problem was examined further, and as he became more familiar with the workings of the DAS, two tentative conclusions seemed to warrant still further investigation. These were:

1. That there were very discernable differences in quality among attaches, and that these seemed to follow definite service lines.

2. That all of the services seemed to have such rigid preconceptions of the standard profile an attache should have that they might be incapable of locating their own best man for a given nomination.

Consequently, in the course of the interviews conducted for this research paper, each officer was asked specifically whether or not he had been able to discern any significant difference, service-wise, among attaches on station, and whether or not he felt that any one service had done or now does a noticeably better or worse job in selecting and/or preparing officers for

attache assignments.

Brigadier General Faurer, while not differentiating between services, did say:

"I simply haven't seen enough attaches on station first-hand to make a meaningful judgment. Judging from what I have seen in Latin America though, I would have to say that almost all of them were below ideal caliber. There were some outstanding exceptions to that statement, however." ⁷

Lieutenant General Walters, basing his judgment upon well over a decade of close observation of attaches, said:

"I may be prejudiced, but I think that, thanks largely to its Foreign Area Specialization Programs, the Army does a little bit better than the others." ⁴

Major General Aarons concurred, saying that he felt that the Army's track record is a little bit better than the other services. ⁸

Rear Admiral Rectanus, while declining any comparisons, did say that:

"The quality of personnel going into the system has fundamentally improved. There is definitely better control within the Navy now of the selection process." ⁵

Major General Wilson went the furthest in answering this question when he responded:

"I would rate the four services this way: the marines, due apparently to their commandants' personal interest in the matter, are definitely doing the best overall job of providing us with outstanding attaches. Another thing that is helping is that they are using the Army's Foreign Area Specialization Program to prepare people before they ever get to us. Next I

would rank the Army. Their Foreign Area Specialization Program gives them a big advantage. Also, and I don't think I'm being too parochial in saying this, I think Army officers tend to wear a 'purple suit' more comfortably. Here, perhaps, its because they aren't so tied to expensive weapons systems. Next, now, would be the Air Force, thanks to the tremendous interest and efforts of Major General Keegan. The emphasis he has placed on getting only the very best officers to serve as attaches is really starting to show. As you probably know, every USAF attache candidate must personally meet a selection panel, and only about 40% of the original nominees are getting past that panel. The Navy nominations are pretty much a one-man show, and Rear Admiral Rectanus is doing a pretty good job of improving the quality of their inputs." ⁶

Two other questions were put to the interviewees that touched on the services' officer inputs into the system. The first of these, "Do you feel that language capability should always be the overriding selection criteria for an Attache?", was prompted by persistent rumors that language was to be the primary criteria governing future nominations from at least one of the three principle services. The responses received indicated that such was not about to be the case, however.

Brigadier General Faurer stated the Air Force's viewpoint when he said:

"I feel, as does Major General Keegan, that language fluency is very important--especially in regard to the most significant posts. What we'd like to see, of course, is a provision to get some in-country practice for our attaches before they report to start their tour; but money is the hangup." ⁷

Lieutenant General Walters, basing his answer on his own long attache experiences, said:

"In the larger countries, such as France, Italy, Germany, etc., I think language fluency is absolutely essential. On the other hand, a knowledge of Tibetan would not be expected." ⁴

Both Major General Wilson and Rear Admiral Rectanus indicated that they felt that language capability should be a major consideration in the attache selection process, but not necessarily an overriding factor. ^{6, 5}

The most comprehensive answer was provided by Major General Aaron when he said:

"Specific station requirements must be aligned with quality of officer to be assigned. I emphasize quality - the officer's performance record, schooling, level of assignments, in both command and staff job dedication and motivation. If the requirement for language fluency is a must, I must determine and judge if this 'quality' officer is trainable in the language to an acceptable level, or if he isn't, keep him earmarked for an area where language fluency is a nice thing to have but not a necessity. You take a linguistic genius who has not consistently performed in an outstanding manner, has a limited range of assignments, limited military schooling, and yes, you have a communicator but you don't have a best qualified well rounded attache. By the same token, you take a water-walker officer, outstanding in every way except he has no aptitude for language - he then cannot be considered for an area where fluency in the language is a mandatory requirement because he is incapable of communicating with his counterparts." ⁸

The last question in this area that was asked of the senior officers was prompted by personal observations of attache selections by other countries as well as those of the U. S.

The question posed was "Do you feel that it is imperative that principal attache billets be filled by officers serving in the grade of Colonel (Navy Captain)?"

Rear Admiral Rectanus answered flatly: "Yes, or higher." ⁵

Brigadier General Faurer essentially agreed, saying:

"I would have qualms about putting a Lieutenant Colonel in a principal billet under most circumstances. The prestige and entree that the higher rank would normally command can't be overlooked lightly. Ideally, of course, we should have even more Flag Officer billets in the system." ⁷

On the other hand, Major General Wilson said:

"No. I think attache selections should be influenced by the rank structure in the applicable host countries. For example, if we're sending a man to an African country where the host nation military forces are commanded by a man wearing the rank of a major, we shouldn't pick a man who's above that grade. Better yet, if we can find a man qualified, a captain could serve. In other instances, in larger countries, if the best man for the job seems to be a Lieutenant Colonel, I think it can be a good idea to pick him on the assumption that he will be promoted on station. I also wish we had brevity authority, as the British do. I frequently found in Moscow that I was able to get to see many Russian officials that would not have seen me if I had been wearing lesser rank. I'm especially anxious to get more flag officers authorized for our 'category I' stations." ⁶

Major General Aaron seemed to agree with the position taken by Major General Wilson when he said:

"No, I don't believe it is imperative in every country. Again, I emphasize, it is quality of attache personnel that should be emphasized. There are small stations that realistically do not require rank higher than Lieutenant Colonel as long as the qualifications of the Lieutenant Colonel are outstanding." ⁸

And Lieutenant General Walters, in commenting on this problem in conjunction with another discussed in Chapter Three of this paper said:

"The billet should be filled by the best man available. If that happens to be a Lieutenant Colonel, give him the job and then promote him on station." ⁴

This last matter is one about which this writer has strong feelings, based on his own observations on station as an attache. There, in Turkey, it was regularly noted that the host nation military, perhaps as rank-conscious a group as exists anywhere, were far less impressed by any foreign attaches' rank than by their own estimation of how far he was likely to advance in the future. As a consequence, those attaches that were promoted while on station, regardless of rank, invariably had greater professional access to host country counterparts than did those more senior officers who they felt were obviously on the edge of retirement, or had no hope of further advancement. Numerous conversations with attaches who have been on station in other countries indicate that such host country feelings are not at all unusual but are, rather, the standard.

Consequently, it would seem prudent for all three services, as well as DIA, to continually review their policies in regard to the matter of rank versus billet. It would seem obvious that the Lieutenant Colonel (or even Major) who can give onlookers the opinion that only time stands between him and the rank

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of General will almost invariably prove to be a more effective
attache than a man easily recognized as far down the road to
(and perhaps already planning for) retirement.

CHAPTER FIVE PREPARATION AND SUPPORT OF ATTACHES

In this chapter, two specific areas of staff responsibility in the Defense Attache System will be discussed. For various reasons, both of these areas have frequently been ones that have awoken great concern in attaches after they have arrived on station.

The first of these is the subject of attache training prior to departing the United States. This training can generally be divided into two categories: (1) language training, and (2) the Defense Intelligence School Attache Course.

As far as comments on language training go, they generally fall into two somewhat oversimplified categories: i.e., very good and very bad. The great majority of attaches this writer has discussed this problem with were victims of civilian contract language training programs administered in the Washington, D. C. area, and those attaches were unanimous in condemning the quality of such training. The remaining attaches spoken to had attended the Defense Language Institute (West Coast) at Monterey, California and were generally quite enthusiastic about the instruction they had received there. Fortunately, the trend in the last few years has been to send the majority of attaches requiring extensive

foreign language training to Monterey, and this problem area is a diminishing one.

The other major portion of attache training, the intelligence course, is what was being targeted when the five flag officers were asked, "Do you think that our attaches are receiving adequate preparation prior to arrival on station?" Only Lieutenant General Walters, who may have been making his judgment largely on comparisons, replied in a completely positive vein. His answer was:

"Yes. I think they are getting good training now. It's certainly far superior to what I got before my first attache assignment. But the key is in the selection process. You can't ever properly prepare the wrong people!" ⁴

Brigadier General Faurer, in a more conservative answer, indicated some misgivings about the language instruction as well when he said:

"Our Air Attaches who complete their training before going on station are 'adequate'. Unfortunately, a good percentage are sent on station at short notice, resulting in training curtailments. My biggest reservations with the training they normally receive are: (1) The language training received in just six months with the Defense Language Institute is inadequate, and (2) The Defense Intelligence School doesn't have sufficient dollars or other resources to properly individually tailor their training." ⁷

Rear Admiral Rectanus also cited the lack of individualized training now available when he stated:

"Training must be individually tailored to both the country and the job. It should be more decentralized. My attache on station should be the 'resident naval expert' for us in that country, and we're not currently providing him adequate training for that role." ⁵

Major General Aaron was also aware of some discontent with the Defense Intelligence School Attache Course, but he seemed perhaps more optimistic than the officers quoted above that solutions were close at hand when he said:

"Most frequent comments from Army attache designates to my staff are (a) for better guest lecturers - the calibre of speakers at the FSI, for instance. (b) For those attaches destined for non-communist bloc countries, less emphasis on training on Communist Bloc and increased emphasis on the training for area(s) of assignment. (c) More directed/supervised research and (d) more dynamic and inspired staff personnel.

"I would say that the preparation is adequate. However, there is room for improvement and I believe improvements are being made and there appears to be an ongoing effort to seek out and identify areas for improvement.

"The selection and assignment of a former attache to head the Attache Department of the Defense Intelligence School was a good step in the right direction. This officer, based on his experience as an attache, has made a real effort to improve the curriculum and the calibre of his staff in the short time he has been there. Attaches are urged to submit their ideas, comments, and recommendations on the training and I believe he will give serious consideration to the attaches' recommendations." 8

Major General Wilson apparently agreed that there was indeed room for improvement when he stated:

"I think that the D.I.S., in its present form, is inadequate. I think we may, for example, be placing too much emphasis on [] considering the types of environments most of our attaches are heading out to. I presently am forming a review panel to completely reassess that curriculum." 6

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It is this writer's opinion that the curriculum review ordered by Major General Wilson is certainly called for. However, serious thought should be given before any portion of the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] training is deleted. It might be suggested that serious attention be paid to the working conditions of that large percentage of our attaches who must operate in what could be called a "semi-hostile" environment. [REDACTED]

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This chapter's second area of discussion is the matter of the quality of support that attaches on station receive from their sponsors. In this writer's experience, that has, in the past, ranged from excellent to disgraceful. Generally, it has been found that responses to requests for financial augmentation have been dealt with promptly and generously; but the responses to other types of requests were frequently absurd. For example, the occasional requests for release of relatively uncomplicated

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classified data [REDACTED] have usually been met by unacceptably slow and pitifully inadequate responses. Requests such as one forwarded from the Turkish Air Force in 1970 for assistance in obtaining manuals to help reorganize their intelligence structure have found the attache in a very embarrassing position when, as of four months later, the only thing he has

received from the U. S. in response is a series of publications detailing the proper care and training of sentry dogs.

Because of a multitude of such experiences, the interview question "Do you feel that DIA and the services are providing all possible support to attaches on station?" was asked.

Lieutenant General Walters answered:

" Yes. I think that the support that attaches receive is essentially comparable to that provided by other agencies to their own personnel. However, I think that DIA and the services are making a big mistake in not automatically bringing each primary attache back to the U.S. to act as an escort officer when, during his period of assignment on station, the Chief of his counterpart host nation service makes a protocol visit here. Absolutely unmatched entrees are lost because of our failures to take advantage of such opportunities." 4

Like Lieutenant General Walters, Major General Aaron also answered the question primarily from a standpoint of funding support:

"I am doing all I can to provide maximum support to Army Attaches. Funding and personnel constraints are deterrents to my all-out support for Army Attaches. On those stations where there is no Army Attache, I provide support to the service representative when the need for Army support is apparent or requested." 8

Major General Wilson stated that he was really not sure whether the maximum possible support was being provided at the present time. He added:

"I'm empirically certain that there is room for improvement, but I can't pinpoint any specific areas offhand." 6

In replying to the same question, Brigadier General Faurer interpreted it more broadly and said:

"I feel that DIA and the services always want to provide support, but I'm sure that it's not always done. I'm sure that our attaches and DATTs aren't always helped as much as they might be in their internal battles with their ambassadors, etc." 7

And Rear Admiral Rectanus made an excellent point when he said:

"No. Not enough is being done to keep the attache in personal touch with the key intelligence analysts of his own service. The attache may be in touch with the right people in DIA, but too often he isn't in good enough contact with people like the Foreign Technology Division, as well as the analysts in his own service headquarters, who may have significant needs totally apart from those of DIA." 5

In the opinion of this writer, all of the above remarks are accurate ones. It is very true that support directly dependent upon funding is generally being provided to the absolute limit that fiscal restraints permit. But, while the past three years have shown greatly increasing responsiveness to attaches in other areas, it is in these other areas that the greatest strides still need to be taken. Still more attention should be paid to ensuring that attaches are aware of exactly who they should call upon for various types of support. And even more importantly, those organizations who would provide such support must somehow become more responsive to the needs of attaches.

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CHAPTER SIX PROBLEMS ON THE STATIONS

There have been two relationships that attaches have frequently had difficulty in coping with after they have arrived at their duty stations. These are the Attache/State Department (or Foreign Service Officer) relationship, and the professional relationship that the Defense Attache Offices must maintain with their counterparts from the Central Intelligence Agency.

The first of these, the attache's relationship with the State Department, is usually the most vexing. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the attache serves three masters, and the first and physically closest of these is his ambassador. Frequently, in his desire to achieve goals of his parent service or of DIA, the attache finds himself at cross-purposes with his ambassador or one of the subordinate Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). In such cases, an effective attache will usually negotiate a common ground or in some other way avoid any confrontation. But this writer felt, in his experiences, that many disagreements that arose between attaches and FSOs were grounded in subtle bases. As a result of witnessing many such situations over an extended period, it was decided to ask the following question in the interviews for this paper:

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"Do you feel any problem exists today on stations because of State Department reluctance to recognize military attaches' status, duties, or abilities?"

In replying, every one of the five senior officers started with a very firm "yes." Major General Aaron, in a fairly mild response, then went on to say:

"I believe there are problems in some areas. To some extent, I believe the duties and responsibilities of attaches are not clearly understood, not only by State but even within the military services. Education of appropriate personnel in departments and agencies to include the military services on attache duties and responsibilities is a real need. It would help to resolve the lack of appreciation and recognition of the importance of attache duty." 8

Rear Admiral Rectanus stated that he felt that such lack of appreciation or recognition by the State Department is a major problem and that he thought it could be attributed at least in part to a degree of rivalry existing between attaches and their FSO counterparts. 5

Major General Wilson felt that:

"Some ambassadors are intrinsically anti-military. Not too many though, thank goodness. But it's here that the attache's first and foremost mission is to sell himself." 6

And Brigadier General Faurer went on to say:

"I don't think that the State Department would be at all disappointed if the DAS disappeared completely. They could then fill the void with political-military advisors." 7

Perhaps the strongest agreement with the premise that FSOs often fail to give proper recognition to military attaches' status,

and one which very accurately states the suspicions of this writer, came from Lieutenant General Walters when he said:

"Not only does a definite rivalry exist, but I think that State Department officers see even U.S. military uniforms as objects of or representatives of hostility and they usually act accordingly!"⁴

There is no quick and easy resolution to this strained relationship. It might be suggested though, that the eventual solution may lie in a combination of continued selection of only the most competent officers to serve as attaches, and then more carefully educating them that such feelings do apparently exist within the State Department. Then, hopefully, these future attaches can eventually erode some of these hostilities through their own continuing demonstrations of good faith and their willingness to work with the FSOs to achieve results that can be accepted by both.

The relationship between the attaches and the CIA, while seldom as strained as some situations that have arisen involving the State Department, nevertheless is one with great potential for friction. Almost invariably, the attaches will find themselves concerned with some areas of reporting that CIA is also concerned with. And almost as invariably, when both groups find themselves reporting on the same subjects, there are likely to be at least minor - and possibly major - areas of disagreement between them, just as is often the case with attaches and FSOs. Because of this potential for conflict, the five senior officers were each asked "Do you feel that the Defense Attache Office/CIA/State Department

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relationship could be improved in any fundamental way?"

Rear Admiral Rectanus indicated that he thought that any problems with CIA were largely jurisdictional ones, and that most of these could be avoided if CIA would ".....avoid military matters in-country." ⁵

Major General Wilson also cited the jurisdictional aspects when he said:

"The D.A.O. function is that of an overt observer. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Strictly from the bureaucratic standpoint, the C.I.A./D.A.O. relationship needs further clarification." ⁶

And Major General Aaron gave a very similar answer when he stated:

"As far as I know the relationship between C.I.A. personnel and D.A.O. personnel is not a problem area at this time. There have been and from time to time may be instances where differences exist between State representatives and C.I.A. personnel and the Attaches on collecting and reporting political/military information. D.I.A. ⁸ has the responsibility to resolve these differences."

Lieutenant General Walters indicated that he felt that any such problems were more often ones caused by individuals rather than organizational postures, and that they could usually be resolved "....by each of them trying to rid themselves of parochialism." ⁴

And Brigadier General Faurer was essentially agreeing with him when he said:

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"I think there are very few institutional problems any more. Individual competency would solve almost all the problems that exist now."

It is difficult to dispute Brigadier General Faurer's position. And if his view is accepted, then the remaining problem facing the Defense Intelligence Agency is to continue to try to man the attache corps only with the very highest caliber of officers that the services will provide and then to provide them with the most comprehensive training possible. And it seems a logical corollary that the services should want to provide their most elite officers to the Defense Attache System. For only with the "best of the best" assigned to the attache corps, i.e., the soldier/diplomat "renaissance man" are the remaining on-station interagency problems likely to disappear.

CHAPTER SEVEN
AN APPRAISAL

At this point, after having looked at so many problems of the Defense Attache System, it would seem appropriate to discuss the current worth of that system, and what its future is likely to be. To this end, the same five senior officers were each asked how they would evaluate the D.A.S. now, in terms of both cost effectiveness and overall effectiveness.

Brigadier General Faurer stated strongly that:

"The D.A.S. is a highly cost effective collection asset. For a minimum expenditure of dollars, we're getting a very great return. On top of which, for that same outlay, we're getting an analyst as well as a collector. The true effectiveness is a difficult thing to define or assess, but I believe it to be equally high." ⁷

Major General Wilson was even more emphatic when he said:

"The D.A.S. is the most cost effective HUMINT collection activity this country has. There are some very detailed studies to back this up. We get back some \$10.00 in intelligence value for every \$1.00 we spend. As far as overall effectiveness is concerned, we still have a way yet to go. Station by station, of course, this will vary, since so much depends on interpersonal chemistry." ⁶

Lieutenant General Walters answered the question very thoroughly when he stated:

"The term 'cost effective' is a very questionable quantification. At an annual cost of approximately 26 million dollars, the amount of information collected represents a very good return on investment, but it hardly tells the whole story. The real returns on an attache's efforts often don't show up until as much as ten years later. One of an attache's main jobs is to be a military ambassador, and to cast a favorable impression in his host nation of himself, his parent U.S. military service, and the U.S.A. in general." ⁴

And Rear Admiral Rectanus was alluding to the same "ambassadorial" roles of the attache when he said:

"The D.A.S. is the most cost-effective collection activity we have. But some of its ⁵ greatest accomplishments are not written down."

Looking even more broadly at the specific question and its ramifications, Major General Aaron stated:

"I cannot provide a definitive answer to this question as I have no facts and figures readily available on which to make a comparison. Philosophically, I believe that man remains a most important collector and source of intelligence information. As a collector, he is unique as a multi-sensor, retargettable vehicle, capable of conveying literal information. As a source, he is exploitable in a variety of ways. The technological developments in recent years have certainly increased our collection capability, also, our costs. However, this technical capability should be viewed as complementary to and not as a replacement for human source collection, regardless of comparative costs. Highly qualified attaches, selected for their professionalism, judgement, experience and dedication, may well be our most valuable human sources, particularly as our military forces overseas diminish." ⁸

To a man, the five intelligence community leaders would seem to agree with Major General Aaron's assessment that military attaches are "...our most valuable human sources." However,

the Defense Attache System is fraught with problems; some only vexing trifles, others major harassments which, in some cases, actually impede or impair accomplishment of its mission. How then can we make better use of what Rear Admiral Rectanus calls "....the most cost effective collection asset we have."?

As has been shown, some of these problems are inherent in the structure of the DIA/DATT system itself; and, for these, there are no simple solutions. The DATT system is far from perfect, but it is the best system devised to date - especially from a cost standpoint - and its outright abolishment in the near future is highly unlikely and, perhaps, just as well so. However, this does not mean that modifications cannot or should not be made within the existing framework. Paramount in importance among these would seem to be a redefinition of and stronger delineation of the role of the DATT as "chairman of the board", and a clarification of the related roles of other principal service attaches serving with him.

The problems of manning comprise another area that offers no easy answers. In these times of austerity for the military, with further budgetary and personnel cutbacks lurking around every bend in the road, and with yet wider commitments appearing every year as new DAOs open in more countries across the globe, how can the D.A.S. continue to meet muster with enough people to accomplish their assigned tasks? The answer would seem to lie at least partially in ensuring that the key authorities have a clear and accurate picture of the true value and effectiveness of the Defense

Attache System. That those authorities (most specifically those members of the United States Congress who actually control the budget allocations for the D.A.S.) do not now have such an appreciation was the opinion of every one of the officers interviewed for this paper. Major General Aaron could have been speaking for all of them when he said:

"I believe that few people, departments and agencies recognize the potential of the attache as one of the best HUMINT collectors. Too frequently, the attache representational role is believed to be the only mission performed.

I don't believe Congress recognizes the attache for his importance in either role. Our attaches continue to be the 'poor relatives' of the embassy family - denied the many benefits accorded to all other embassy personnel - home leave, periodic consultations with parent organization, educational allowances for children, emergency leave via paid commercial transportation, differential pay and rest and recuperation trips from hardship posts to name a few.

There is a lot of educating to be done, not only with Congress, but throughout the government on the Defense Attache System and the significant contributions of our attaches." 8

However, even with a clear picture of the mission of the Defense Attache System installed in the minds of Congressmen and other key officials, it would seem to be in keeping with the current military facts of life that the D.A.S. is destined to be manned and financed at less than optimum levels. How then, can "less" be stretched to accomplish more?

When viewed in this light, it is obvious where the burden must fall: on the shoulders of the individual attache, on station. His personal qualifications, motivation, and training are the

fundamental assets of the D.A.S. If these are clearly superior, basic faults in the system, even severe budgetary constrictions, can be minimized. If, however, the individual attache is deficient, optimum management techniques and a surfeit of money will not suffice.

Therefore, the primary problem facing the Defense Attache System would seem clear: a need now - and in the future - to painstakingly select and comprehensively train only the "best of the best" to be the military attaches of the United States. Only such officers can ever do justice to the responsibilities inherent in an attache's multifold mission.

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